The INF was followed in 1991 by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the Soviet Union and the United States. START limits the number of long-range nuclear vehicles and the warheads they can carry. The destruction of the missiles was verified through an intrusive control system that included on-site inspections and regular exchange of information, as well as national technical means. The revision provisions of the agreement are more intrusive than those of the FN Treaty, which provides for 12 different types of inspections. The contracting parties to the agreement (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, as nuclear successors to the Soviet Union, as well as the United States) verified whether contractual limits had been reached by 2001. Compliance issues can be raised by the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, which meets about twice a year. The contract expires in 2009, unless it is renewed by the parties. A start-II follow-up agreement was concluded in 1993, but never came into force. The two parties no longer feel connected to it. Hence the paradox and the problem. Such periods of mistrust and antagonism are perhaps the most necessary at a time when arms control is most necessary to limit the seriousness of the mistrust that is turning into a dangerous arms race.
(Where tensions have subsided and confidence has increased, there is less need to limit weapons because there is less sense of threat. We don`t need arms control to feel comfortable, for example, with the British arsenal.) The challenge is that arms control is the least reliable when it is most urgent in the management of a country in the approach of legality without Principles of Russia. Recent arms control contracts provide for stricter conditions for enforcement of offences and verification. The latter has been a major obstacle to effective implementation, as offenders often attempt to secretly circumvent the terms of the agreements. The audit determines whether or not a nation is complying with the terms of an agreement, and it is a combination of the disclosure of that information by participants and a way to verify each other`s information to verify that information.  This often involves as much negotiation as the borders themselves and, in some cases, revision issues have led to the failure of contract negotiations (for example. B, the revision was mentioned as a major concern by opponents of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which was ultimately not ratified by the United States).   The evaluation of arms control as a process, not as a result, provides the best understanding of the problem.